Abstract In this paper we describe an algorithm for the tion of data (e.g. key material) and computation across distribution of trust authority functions such as key gener-nodes in a dynamic MANET as required for a distributed ation and distribution in tactical mobile ad hoc networks.
I. INTRODUCTION implemented model. Finally, section V discusses our ongoing and planned extensions to the model and algorithms Security architectures often tacitly assume the availabil-for efficient and robust TA distribution in tactical MANET ity of cryptographic services, which may not be the case environments.
for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Trust authority (TA) services form the basis for many advanced services, II. RELATED WORK and the bootstrapping and their continued availability represent a significant challenge from both efficiency and secu-Overlays aid Clusterstas a Structuring Mechanism for Inrity perspectives, particularly in hostile environments such formation Collection and Dissemination as tactical networks. Such networks are self-organizing, In recent years clusters have been widely utilised to deself-discovering, rapidly changing in topology and devoid termine subsets of mobile ad hoc networks under the obof dedicated infrastructural elements, and must cope with jective of saving energy [9] , enhancing routing protocols both active adversaries and limited resources such as en- [10] , finding efficient flooding [11] , [12] , and broadcasting ergy, bandwidth, and computational power. Services to mechanism [13] , or to generally build low-cost backbones be provided, regardless of whether for traditional public [14] . Clusters have also been applied in recent research on key infrastructures (PKI) or for identity-based public key distributing trust authorities in ad hoc networks [1] , [2] . cryptography (ID-PKC) include the creation, distribution, Bechler [1] establishes a security architecture using clusand revocation of keys, as well as layered services such as tering and (k, n)-threshold cryptography, but does not conauthentication and authorization. sider trustworthiness. In each cluster, exactly one distinRecent research has investigated the issue of establishing guished node, the cluster head, is responsible for establisha PKI on a subset of nodes in the network [1] , [2] based on ing and organizing the cluster. Clusters are formed as geothe use of cluster algorithms for the determination of clus-graphically needed: If nodes cannot find existing clusters, ter heads. Simultaneously, numerous authors have focused they create some themselves, with existing clusters being on the propagation of trust and developed models for estab-merged and split on demand. Secret shares are distributed lishing trust in MANETs [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . In this paper, among the cluster heads, and thus are constantly (but not we report on the efficiency gained by combining such clus-necessarily securely) spread over the network. A further ter algorithms with selected additional metrics, including drawback in Bechlers work is the significant relevance of trust, battery capacity of participating nodes, and metrics gateway nodes, which act as connectors between neighpertaining to the underlying network, namely cost of rout-bored clusters. As Bechlers simulation results illustrate, ing, bandwidth requirements, and desirable per-hop signal 34.2% of the overhead traffic is produced by the gateway strengths. This provides robust criteria for the distribu-nodes, whereas the cluster heads only produce 47.5% of NY 20-22 June 2007 issue of trust establishment assuming that every node has cates. A user assigns a value from the set {unknown, not already exchanged a public key and a session secret key trusted, marginally trusted, fully trusted} to evwith its direct neighbors. Since we assume wireless data ery key he retrieves. The reduction to only four different transfer, there is no reason why these initially exchanged types of trust allows the model to be implemented easkeys should be trustworthy, calling the underlying assump-ily. However, Maurer [18] showed that due to this simtions into question.
plicity the model may delivers counter-intuitive results in For the purposes of TA distribution, conventional clus-special scenarios. A seminal approach to define a trust tering suffers from the fact that cluster formation is heavily metric in the form of a model for public-key certification, influenced by the initial geometry of the network, typically trust and recommendations was defined by Maurer [3] in resulting in a central node of the cluster becoming clus-1996. Maurer established the syntax of certificates, ter head, rather than the most trustworthy one. In ad-recommendation, trust and authenticity of public dition, the same effect also leads to undesirable bunching keys, which form the axioms of his model. Based on these of TA nodes, which increases the risk of compromise of axioms, two intuitive inference rules are defined which perlarger groups. This is partially addressed by probabilis-mit drawing of transitive conclusions from a set of given tic approaches such as the one proposed by Zongpeng [15] . axioms. Since this model is totally deterministic, Maurer Here, every node participates in a communication back-inserts in a second step the consideration of confidence on bone with a certain probability dependent on the number a continuous scale between 0 and 1. This model is generic of its neighbors. Although this approach creates an energy-in the sense that it allows confidence values in a continuefficient backbone, it does not consider the energy and de-ous scale from 0 to 1 and considers inferences of arbitrary pletion levels of the nodes. While overlays represent a gen-depth and complexity. In order to enable a real impleeral organizing principle for creating node subsets of inter-mentation and a computation without exponential comests, the cost of creating and maintaining such networks plexity, Caronni [5] suggested several possible simplificais non-negligible. This suggests the possible use of multi-tions. However, the model can also be considered quite purpose overlays to balance the costs across several appli-basic regarding the choice of axioms. The set of axioms in cations. However, for the purposes of this investigation we the original version does e.g. not contain a time parameare not interested in developing new cluster algorithms but ter, which is necessary for key revocation. Marchesini [19] rather to develop a cluster metric which incorporates the addressed this issue and extended Maurer's model by ax-TA requirements into existing algorithms. The metric is ioms for properties, time and domain and thus provided intended as an open collection of parameters which can be numerous additional abilities of the system, including key extended as required; for the purposes of the discussion revocation. In 2006 Bicakci [20] also investigated the incorhere, we concentrate on the aspects of trust metrics and poration of certificate revocation in this system and Gligor constraints imposed by the tactical MANET environment [21] discussed the need of additional parameters such as itself, namely limited battery capacity, and RF interface multiple types of evidence, negative evidence, and false evconstraints. Evaluation of the efficacy of the cluster metric idence when using Maurer's model in ad-hoc networks. Reis achieved by using the algorithm reported in [16] for max-cent further work on trust metrics includes research by Sun min d-cluster formation in wireless ad hoc networks. This [6] , who proposes two axioms for trust models, namely that algorithm results in each node either being a cluster head (1) concatenation propagation of trust does not increase itself or being at most d hops away from a cluster head. trust and (2) multipath propagation of trust does not reAs d is configurable and the selection criterion in the ba-duce trust. Sun proposes two trust models which handle sic algorithm is formed by the node identification numbers, trust as a value between -1 and 1. Both models can rewe substitute this value by a cluster metric as described in turn counter-intuitive results, since the concatenation of section 111-C.6. The following briefly reviews related work two negative trust values can in both models result in a on trust metrics, as this partial metric has been the most positive value. Although Sun seems to break the first axintensely studied. have not been explicitly proposed in the form of metrics, th reutn trs au n hsbra h eodaim we have adapted them to provide consistent terminology. . In this paper we propose the winner value to all of its 1-hop neighbors. After all neighfirst distribution algorithm, that is configurable by loadable boring nodes have been heard from, for a single round, the and accurate defined metrics. Especially the trust metric, node chooses the largest value among its own winner value which is a modification of Maurer's metric [3] , provides a and the values received in the round as its new winner. subtle tradeoff between accuracy and feasibility.
This process continues for d rounds.
III. MODEL In our extension of Amir's algorithm the winner value A. Definitions is represented by a quality factor instead of the node identity. Moreover, the base algorithm's approach of choosing Ad-hoc networks are commonly modeled as a graph its d-hop cluster head based on the decisions of neighbor- These modifications in Amis' algorithm yield a reduction A cluster algorithm is used to determine the subset of in message complexity and hence also energy consumption. TA nodes in the MANET. Without loss of generality and Owing to the stack forwardInfo cluster packets not beas noted in section II, we use a modification of Amis' [16] ing forwarded directly, the respective information is simply algorithm for the initial implementation and evaluation of added to the next own packet. Even though this strategy the metrics used in distributing TA services. The underly-decelerates the information exchange, the decisions of the ing principle of deterministic cluster algorithms is to have nodes will be build on more up-to-date information than each node exchange information with immediate neighbors in Amis' original algorithm, since a decision is not longer and decide whether it is to be a TA node itself or whether made in d steps. A further advantage of the TA cluster alto accept a peer node as a TA node. If a node A accepts gorithm is the strategy of completely local decisions, which another node B as a TA node, then node B will be the are only based on collected information rather than on deconnector to the TA for node A. In the case of Amis' algo-cisions of other nodes in previous rounds. This property rithm this information exchange procedure is performed d permits building the cluster with very limited additional times, what yields a network where every node has a maxi-message traffic. In a network with an active data exchange mal distance of d hops to its TA-connector. Amis describes and an underlying routing protocol, the information rethe basic idea of his algorithm as follows: quired by the cluster algorithm could simply be added onto Initially, each node sets its winner2 to be equal to its own other packets sent over the network. The actual message node id. This is followed by the floodmaxc phase. complexity in tactical networks does, however, depend on a number of parameters such as mobility and reachabil1For consistency, cluster heads are labeled TA nodes.
ity (e.g. caused by topographical constraints) and will be 2wne saT oei h otx ftis paper. investigated further in future work. TrustA,x, Distrustx,y F-DistrustA,y (4) are merged to a cluster metric using a linear combination.
TrUStA,X, Autx V AUtA,Y (5) This itself requires a linear and continuous mapping of the partial metrics and weighting for relative importance. The Rules (3) and (4) represent the forwarding of trust informetrics discussed in this section are not exhaustive; the mation over one hop, while (5) shows the mechanism to use of additional partial metrics is therefore discussed in include additional statements in the model. The statesection V.
ment Distrust and additional rule (4) are necessary, since C.1 Trust metric in the deterministic model every statement can only have the value 0 or 1, whereas we wish to model the three levels The trust metric is the core of the cluster metric, since of trust "indifferent", "trusted" and "not trusted". it induces the cluster algorithm to determine a set of es-. Probabilistic part The deterministic model part desentially trustworthy TA nodes. In this paper, a modifica-fined all parameters of the trust model as fixed statements tion of Maurer's [3] model for a public key infrastructure and inference. This allowed the deduction of all implicitly is used; however, both different trust model and valuations available statements. The probabilistic part adds the nocan be used, provided that the constraints described in tion of uncertainty to statements in a continuous certainty section 111-C are satisfied. Maurer's model consists of two range [0,1] with events assumed to follow the Laplace hyparts, a deterministic and a probabilistic one. The basic pothesis. Every event is true only with a certain probabilmodel is, however, not suitable for implementation owing ity, and the core of the probabilistic part is to determine to its computational complexity and must be adapted in the certainty of the inferred events (statements). The folits deterministic part as described in the following section: lowing provides a brief summary of the model, for details . Deterministic part The deterministic part defines the on the base model refer to [3] .
parameters, which are considered by the model, and defines The set of statements which are contained in a node's A inference rules for these parameters. Maurer labels the view is denoted by ViewA. The closure of ViewA under parameters as statements which include the Authenticity the inference rules (3)- (5) is then labeled with ViewA, and of public keys, Trust, Certificates and Recommendations. contains the whole statement knowledge of node A includBased on those statements Maurer defines two inference ing inferred statements. Since every statement shall be rules, which consider recommendations of arbitrary depth. certain in a range from 0 to 1, the certainty of a stateIf e.g. a node A believes in the authenticity of a node X ment is represented by the probability that this statement and he also trusts X to administer certificates and X holds a is true and the probability P(S C ViewA) is labeled concertificate of Y, then A will also believe in the authenticity fidence value. The probability of an inferred statement of node Y (see [3] for details).
S from node A is the probability of this statement beThe first simplification of [3] yielding a reduction of com-ing inferable from statements included in ViewA, i.e. that plexity especially in the computations of the probabilistic S C VieWA. With SA denoting the power set of VieWA, the part, is to restrict the trustworthiness statements to level 1, confidence value conf (S) for a statement S can be defined disallowing the use of second-hand evidence. For the pur-as conf(S) =P(S C ViewA) = EVCSA SCVP(V) pose of building a pure trust model, we will also redefine The model defined so far allows to specify arbitrary depenthe statements in [3] as follows:
dencies between the statements in SA. Having limited the -Trust. Trustx,y denotes X's belief that a particular level of inferences to 1, P(V) can be computed as:
entity Y is a member of a friendly party and thus trustworthy for forwarding information and being a TA member.
P(V) =JI| p(S) J7J (1 -p(S))
-Distrust. Distrustx,y denotes X's belief that a particscv sfv ular entity X is generally not trustworthy for forwarding information or being a TA member. Finally, the probability p(S) for a derived statement S can In order to avoid a permanent transmission breakdown of data transfer to a small number of nodes, this can exceed between a node and its TA connection, its desirable to the nodes' bandwidth. In order to avoid delays or dropped choose a nearby node as TA connection. Since the distance packets, the bandwidth metric measures the load of a node between two nodes does not necessarily represent their con-regarding its available bandwidth. As before, we use the nection quality, we choose the signal strength as a measure IEEE 802.11g standard for our example without loss of for the nearness of nodes. The signal strength is commonly generality. In 802.11g the data rate at a point of time specified in dBm and the benchmark data are provided by is dependent on the signal strength and varies between 8 the maximal transmission power (100mW = 2OdBm using values from 6 Mbps3 to 54 Mbps. We label these values dr1 the IEEE 802.11 standard as an example) and the thresh-(data rate 1) to drs, where dr1 represents the lowest rate of old for the minimal required receiving power of -8OdBm 6 Mbps and drs the highest rate, respectively. Moreover, [25] . Since dBm already provides a logarithmized and thus we define dr= Ldr as the highest dri that is lower than feasible measure for the original mW values, we use the dr, and di, 1 < i < 8 denotes the respective data rate. dBm values to define the signal strength factor fs for a Assuming that an available data rate at least two level signal strength s[dBm] as fs = s+-O above the minimum required one for the real data rate 100 dr is most feasible, we define the bandwidth factor fb as C. in case of a broken side condition, i.e. at least one partial metric returns a negative value. In order to evaluate the functionality of the trust metric, we ran a simulation were
The quality factor forms the basis for the determination 2 of 50 nodes were configured as enemies, while the nodes of the TA overlay. It is computed by the combination of were able to identify each others as enemy or friend if they several metrics as described in section 111-C, and the conmoved closer than 10 metres. After 100 seconds in a 700m straints were considered by setting the quality to 0 if approx 700m area, all friendly nodes had a trust value about priate. Once the quality factors have been determined, the the both enemy nodes of -0.8 or smaller and thus did not cluster algorithm can elect a near-optimal set of TA nodes choose them as TA nodes at all. In a second simulation 2 while minimizing message traffic. Since every cluster algonodes were only configured as enemies for a period of 30 rithm is bound to local information exchange and to local seconds, such that only two other nodes had physical con-decisions, there are two crucial constraints regarding the tact with these hostile nodes during this 30 seconds. Even quality of the resulting cluster, namely after 15 minutes the other nodes were changing their opin-1. Limited information exchange in the cluster ions about the two temporarily hostile nodes, what shows 2. Self-selection of cluster heads
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United States Military Academy, West Point, NY 20-22 June 2007 In order to measure the effect of each of these two influ-a higher number of nodes generally decreases the mean. It ences, we define the following three overlay configurations: can be seen from the simulations that the influence of local 1. The effectively chosen configuration describes the set decisions (constraint 2) reduces the configuration quality of TA nodes, which is selected by local decisions of the QualR on average by a factor of 1.2 to 1.4. The limited innodes and the information provided by the cluster algo-formation exchange in the cluster causes a reduction of the rithm. So as to approximately determine the respective quality, which is highly dependent on the mobility model subset of nodes, the cluster algorithm and the metrics have and the time period of information broadcasting. Figure  been implemented in the network simulator NS-2.
2 illustrates the quality value Qual and the related num-2. The optimum cluster configuration represents the best ber of nodes for configurations 1 through 3. The nodes in choice of the TA nodes based on information is provided by the corresponding scenario were moving with a speed bethe cluster algorithm which is still valid. Since the deter-tween 1 and 20m/s, while the broadcasting time period of mination of TA nodes is not influenced by local decisions the nodes was set to ls. Although the time period of ls but by the limited information provided by the cluster al-is five times longer than proposed by Bechler [1] and Jiun gorithm, the difference between the quality of this configu- [2] , the quality loss caused by constraint 1 (difference beration and the effectively chosen configuration is a measure tween Qual value of dotted and dashed line in figure 2 ) is for drawback 2. marginal. The quality loss due to local decisions in the net- In this paper we have described basic mechanisms for Let S be the set of all TA configurations, then the highest distributing TA services in tactical networks based on the possible quality value BestQualR is defined as BestQualR = development of combination metrics and their applications maxsEs QualR(S). The global optimum configuration Best-in a cluster-based algorithm which can be used both in the ConfR for a Belief Set R is then one not necessarily unique creation of service information overlays and together with TA configuration S with QualR(S) =BestQualR additional lower-layer routing mechanisms. To permit the
The crucial point in this definition is the quality value creation of TA services with limited assumptions while also QualR, which is fixed as the average sum of quality values taking advantage of already existing routing protocols, as on the respective TA nodes. This definition tends to fa-typically provided in tactical networks, we investigated the vor configurations with a small number of TA nodes, since determination of a feasible subset of TA nodes under the
